Hedge Funds and Financial Crises: 2007 - 2009 Performance Characteristics by Klofas, Jeffrey M.
Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:106755
This work is posted on eScholarship@BC,
Boston College University Libraries.
Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2016
Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted.
Hedge Funds and Financial Crises: 2007
- 2009 Performance Characteristics
Author: Jeﬀrey M. Klofas
*I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Ireland for sparking my interest in 
Financial Economics and for serving as an invaluable resource to me throughout the 
year. All your help and guidance is very much appreciated.   
 
 
 
Hedge Funds and Financial Crises: 
2007 – 2009 Performance Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Jeffrey M. Klofas 
Advisor: Professor Peter Ireland* 
 
 
 
 
Boston College Department of Economics 
Undergraduate Honors Thesis 
May 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
We study historical hedge fund performance characteristics with a particular 
focus on the 2007 – 2009 Financial Crisis (the “Crisis”). Using the Credit Suisse 
Hedge Fund Indexes as proxies for broader hedge fund industry performance, we 
apply a factor model based on common investment strategies to determine if the 
broad industry or any particular hedge fund strategies have been able to deliver 
excess returns, or alpha. We find evidence that the broad hedge fund index did 
deliver statistically significant excess monthly returns of 0.39% (4.67% annualized) 
over the period January 1995 – January 2016, with seven of ten individual strategy 
indexes contributing. However, our results indicate that these excess returns were 
delivered primarily during the pre-Crisis period of January 1995 – November 2007. 
Over this period, the broad index delivered statistically significant monthly excess 
returns of 0.49% (5.93% annualized), with six of ten individual strategy indexes 
contributing. Our results do not indicate, however, that hedge funds delivered 
statistically significant monthly excess returns over the period December 2007 – June 
2009 or over the period December 2007 – December 2012, which takes into account 
the uniquely drawn out recovery from the Crisis. We find that the broad index 
delivered statistically significant excess monthly returns of 0.23% (2.74% annualized) 
during the post-Crisis period, though these returns are less than half of the pre-Crisis 
period returns and only three individual strategy indexes contributed. We posit that 
this apparent shift in performance characteristics might be the result of a shift in the 
risk tolerances of hedge fund investors and managers following the Crisis. We 
conclude that, while hedge funds might certainly serve legitimate purposes in 
financial markets, they are not immune to financial crises, especially those as severe 
as the Crisis. 
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1 Introduction 
The growth of the hedge fund industry since the 1990s has been astounding. 
At year-end 1997 overall industry assets under management were a mere $170 
billion. Prior to a sharp decline during the 2007 – 2009 Financial Crisis (the “Crisis”), 
hedge fund assets under management had reached $3.33 trillion. Hedge funds 
suffered during the Crisis, as did most other investment entities, but the industry 
appears to be rebounding. Assets under management through the end of 2015 are 
once again in excess of $3 trillion and the investor base of hedge funds seems to be 
diversifying. We seek to quantify hedge fund performance and, in particular, 
determine whether or not managers can deliver excess returns. In section 1.1 we 
discuss this goal in more detail. Given that the hedge fund industry is not one that the 
“common” investor is generally intimately familiar with, we give a brief overview of 
hedge fund structure, regulation, and strategies in section 1.2. Finally, in section 1.3 
we discuss the motivation behind studying the hedge fund industry, particularly 
during a crisis period. 
1.1 Goals of the Study 
In this paper we conduct an empirical study of the historical performance of 
the hedge fund industry with a focus on the Crisis. In particular, we look at hedge 
fund return characteristics during a number of distinct time periods, including the 
years leading up to, during, and following the Crisis. Although much empirical work 
has been done on the historical performance of the hedge fund industry, Getmanky, 
Lee, and Lo (2015) point out the importance of performing up-to-date analysis. Just 
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as the industry has evolved drastically in the past, it continues to evolve in the current 
market environment. Given the turmoil in the United States economy as a result of 
the most recent financial crisis, as well as the unusually drawn out recovery, it is an 
especially interesting time to evaluate the most recent performance data. 
We are most interested in whether or not there is evidence that hedge fund 
managers have been able to generate returns in excess of those available to the 
“common” investor through commonly traded assets such as equities, fixed income, 
commodities, and foreign exchange products. We might refer to these potential 
excess returns as “alpha,” where 𝛼𝑡 represents excess return at time t. The presence 
of alpha would indicate that investors derive some extra value from allocating capital 
to hedge funds over standard investment vehicles, such as mutual funds. The 
empirical evidence on mutual fund returns has generally indicated that managers are 
unable to provide investors with excess returns. Specifically, Carhart (1997) uses a 
sample of mutual fund returns to demonstrate that, in general, neither superior stock-
picking skills nor better information explain performance persistence in mutual fund 
returns. Rather, common equity market factors and investment expenses explain 
performance. Treynor and Mazuy (1966) do not disregard the fact that mutual fund 
managers may pick undervalued industries and companies and, thus, perform 
relatively well, but their results do not support the idea that active managers can 
skillfully outguess the market and predict its direction. 
Interestingly, Petajisto (2013) finds that, although the average actively 
managed mutual fund does not consistently outperform its benchmark, the most 
heavily actively managed funds have shown some tendency to beat their 
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benchmarks. He interprets these results as being evidence of possible market 
inefficiencies that the most active managers can take advantage of through careful 
security selection. One might posit that, in terms of its manager’s active role in 
security and strategy selection, a typical hedge fund is comparable to a very actively 
managed mutual fund. In this case, Petajisto’s results could be good news for the 
hedge fund industry. 
If hedge fund managers can attribute part of their performance to superior 
strategy and asset selection or to their ability to gain exposure to risk factors other 
than those available to the “common” investor, it seems that they might violate some 
part of the generally accepted principle of efficient markets. First, if hedge funds can 
leverage quantitative strategies1 that rely on historical market prices and technical 
trends, then they seem to violate the idea that asset prices follow a random walk and 
thus cannot be predicted (Fama 1965). Additionally, if managers are able to find 
market anomalies and profit from them, they seem to upset the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (“EMH”), most notably explained by Malkiel and Fama (1970). According 
to the EMH, it should be impossible to outperform the market because asset prices 
incorporate all relevant information. 
We chose to focus on a crisis period because the EMH does not seem to 
support crises. In particular, the Crisis was characterized by a nationwide bubble in 
housing prices that subsequently burst, causing disastrous economic results. The 
                                                 
 
 
1
 Quantitative strategies use computer algorithms to make trading decisions based on technical analysis. High 
frequency trading algorithms are frequently blamed for the Flash Crash of 2010, during which the DOW Jones 
Industrial Average dropped nearly 1000 points in a few minutes. 
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EMH, however, assumes that investors are rational and prices are efficient. If this 
was the case, the formation of such asset price bubbles, due mostly to the irrational 
exuberance of financial market participants, would not occur. Sebastian Mallaby 
(2010), in his insightful history of the hedge fund industry, notes that the EMH does 
not seem to apply during crises and uses the crash of 1987 as an example.2 If 
investor sentiment can create asset bubbles and markets can subsequently undergo 
statistically improbable corrections, then it seems that markets are afflicted with 
underlying inefficiencies. Ideally, a successful hedge fund manager would exploit 
these inefficiencies and generate excess returns.  
The Crisis period will also be useful in allowing us to differentiate between 
alpha and beta return and ensure that hedge funds did not deliver positive returns 
leading up to the Crisis simply because they were riskier. While many investment 
entities performed well prior to the crash, they could only be considered to have had 
an element of excess value-add if returns were not due to systematic risk alone. In 
theory, hedge fund managers command performance fees (to be discussed in 
Section 1.2) precisely because they have the skill to deliver such excess returns to 
their investors. As such, our empirical interest lies in studying a time period when the 
EMH is least likely to accurately describe prevailing market conditions, namely a 
financial crisis. 
                                                 
 
 
2
 Bernhardt and Eckblad (2013) provide a historical overview of this worldwide crash, referred to as “Black 
Monday.” In the United States alone, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 22.6%, the largest one-day 
decline in history. The rapid increase in activity in U.S. markets, structural flaws within markets, and the advent of 
products such as portfolio insurance contributed to the crash.  
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1.2 Hedge Fund Overview 
A hedge fund is typically structured as a general / limited partnership, with the 
general partner being responsible for the operations of the fund and the fund’s 
investors acting as limited partners. A moderate to large portion of the fund’s capital 
often comes from the managers themselves, thus theoretically their interests are 
aligned with the interests of the limited partners. Managers are generally able to 
employ a wide variety of strategies that other investment entities might not be able to. 
Managers can pursue such alternative strategies, which might include short-selling, 
the use of leverage, or complex option and derivative trades, due to the increased 
leeway that hedge funds have in terms of regulation. This is certainly not to say, 
however, that the hedge fund industry is unregulated. Particularly following the Crisis, 
there have been calls for increased regulation across the entire financial industry, 
including hedge funds. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 requires hedge funds with $150 million or more in assets to 
register with the SEC. Additionally, hedge funds are subject to the anti-fraud 
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, must register with the SEC and report 
quarterly if they have more than 499 investors, and often fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
 The Securities Act of 1933 provides companies that offer or sell their securities 
with various exemptions from registration requirements, one of which is selling only to 
accredited investors and qualified purchasers. Accredited investors are defined as 
individuals who have $5 million or more of investments, have net worth of at least $1 
million, or have income of at least $200,000 in the last two years. Qualified 
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purchasers are defined as institutions that have assets over $5 million or at least $25 
million of investments or investable assets.3 Qualified purchasers include a variety of 
recognizable public pension plans, union pension plans, corporate pension plans, 
and universities. Likely due to their perceived riskiness, hedge funds are deemed 
suitable only for individuals and institutions that meet such requirements. However, 
the increased presence of various pension plans and endowments means that a 
broader population of financial market participants is at least indirectly exposed to 
hedge funds. 
 Most hedge funds share a variety of structural similarities. First, the typical 
hedge fund fee structure is unlike that of a mutual fund. There is generally a 
management fee of 1 – 2%, which the manager receives regardless of fund 
performance, followed by a performance fee of around 20%, which the manager 
receives dependent on positive returns to the fund. To ensure that managers are not 
rewarded for poor performance, however, many funds include a highwater mark in 
their structure. Managers collect a performance fee as long as the fund’s returns 
remain above the mark. If the fund experiences losses managers will not receive 
performance fees until the performance returns to the mark. Such a structural 
element ensures that managers make up for any losses before receiving additional 
fees. Additionally, many hedge funds employ a hurdle rate, typically tied to a 
benchmark, such as LIBOR plus a spread, which managers must meet before 
receiving performance fees.  
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 Source: Managed Funds Association. 
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Hedge fund investors are often subject to lock-up periods and subsequent 
withdrawal limitations. An investor must keep all newly invested capital in the fund for 
a minimum amount of time, perhaps a year, before becoming eligible for withdrawals. 
Once the investor meets the required lock-up period he will have limited opportunities 
to withdraw capital, typically on a monthly, quarterly, or yearly basis. Lock-up periods 
and withdrawal limitations allow managers to pursue relatively illiquid assets and to 
make trades that take time to converge while also maintaining solvency and 
compliance with any capital requirements that creditors impose. This is important 
given that illiquid assets and convergence trades are often central elements of hedge 
fund strategies. 
 Hedge funds employ a variety of specific strategies, some of which are 
described in more detail in Appendix A.1, but Fung and Hsieh (1999) provide a useful 
general overview. They first differentiate between relative return investing strategies, 
which seek to outperform a particular benchmark, and absolute return investing 
strategies, which seek to deliver positive returns regardless of market or economic 
conditions. Hedge funds fall into the absolute return category and managers take two 
broad approaches. Managers that use a market timing (directional) strategy attempt 
to bet on the directions of markets, employing either long or short trades in order to 
profit from anticipated turns. Managers who implement non-directional (arbitrage) 
strategies seek to exploit and profit from market anomalies. They structure trades in 
which they take both long and short positions in similar securities, thus eliminating 
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systematic market risk, with the expectation that the two securities will converge to 
their efficient prices over time.4 Of course, hedge funds employ a wide variety of 
complex and unique strategies, but these strategies can generally be described as 
either directional or arbitrage. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The hedge fund industry seems to be evolving in that it is no longer 
necessarily reserved for elite, wealthy individuals. As Mallaby (2010) discusses, 
following the realization of possible market inefficiencies after the Black Monday 
crash in 1987, institutional money began pouring into the industry. In particular, 
university endowments, such as that of Yale University, began diversifying by 
investing in hedge funds. A recent market study by consulting firm KPMG, in 
partnership with the Alternative Investment Management Association and the 
Managed Funds Association (2015), discusses the evolving environment in which 
hedge funds are operating. The report finds that the general consensus among 
surveyed managers is that institutional investors will drive long-term industry growth. 
In fact, most managers who responded to the survey indicated that they believed 
pension funds – both public and corporate – would be their primary sources of capital 
by 2020. Additionally, nearly two-thirds of responding managers indicated that they 
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 Chincarini (2012) provides a good example of one type of arbitrage trade, which was often employed by hedge 
fund Long Term Capital Management: the on-the-run / off-the-run trade. Given that large institutional investors 
often like to hold the most liquid securities, they are more willing to hold on-the-run government bonds. Thus, on-
the-run government bonds have a slightly higher price and a slightly lower yield than off-the-run government 
bonds of the same maturity. Given that the on-the-run bond and the off-the-run bond are essentially the same 
security, LTCM would go long the off-the-run bond and short the on-the-run bond, then profit when the 
government released an even newer issue and the former bonds converged in price. 
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expected the demographics of their clients to become more diverse over the next five 
years. University endowments, public and corporate pension funds, and other 
institutional entities, given that they manage money on behalf of “normal” people, 
expose a much wider population of financial market participants to the risks and 
returns of the hedge fund industry. While high-net-worth individuals might be willing 
to take on excessive risk, “normal” people might very well be unwilling to do so 
without adequate reward in the form of excess returns.  
 Additionally, aggregate hedge fund industry assets under management are 
approaching pre-Crisis levels. From 1997 – 2007, industry assets rose dramatically at 
a compound annual growth rate of 34.4%, peaking at $3.33 trillion before drastically 
declining during the Crisis. Although industry assets under management have growth 
far more slowly at a compound annual growth rate of 5.6% from their 2008 level, 
assets under management through year-end 2015 were $3.24 trillion. Chart 1.3 
contains a yearly breakdown of hedge fund assets under management since 1997. 
The dramatic growth in industry assets leading up to the Crisis may have been a sign 
of market crowding, a topic discussed in depth by Ludwig Chincarini (2012). 
Specifically, Chincarini points to crowding in the real estate market as a precipitant of 
its eventual collapse. Hedge funds, investment banks, brokers, insurance agencies, 
and other entities that had a stake in the real estate market became stuck with illiquid 
assets after so-called “copycat” investors fled the market and severely drove down 
prices. Many of the investors who could not flee subsequently failed when their 
holdings lost value and they became insolvent. 
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 Although total industry assets under management has risen relatively mildly 
following the Crisis, it is certainly worth being cautious as the number approaches 
and eventually exceeds pre-Crisis levels, as it is expected to do. The hedge fund 
industry is no longer a small and insignificant part of the broader market that only 
affects wealthy individuals. Instead, assets under management continue to grow and 
the hedge fund industry is becoming an increasingly entrenched part of the financial 
market. As more and more financial market participants continue to gain exposure to 
the exotic risks to which hedge funds offer exposure, empirical studies of hedge fund 
performance will become increasingly important. 
Chart 1.3: Hedge Fund Industry Assets Under Management, 1997 – 2015 (trillions of 
USD). Source: BarclayHedge. 
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2 Literature Review 
The hedge fund industry has been the subject of much literature, including 
both qualitative and empirical studies. Main Street’s view of hedge funds (and a large 
part of the financial industry for that matter) seems to be historically negative. 
Particularly in the wake of the Crisis, hedge funds, investment banks, and other 
market participants have been called greedy, selfish, and have been held responsible 
for the economy’s drastic decline. Mallaby (2010) alludes to one of the major reasons 
that the public seems to have such a perception: in 2006, when the hedge fund 
industry was booming prior to the Crisis, the bottom manager on Alpha Magazine’s 
list of top 25 hedge fund managers reportedly made $240 million. This was nearly 4.5 
times even the $54 million that Goldman Sachs CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, received.5 If 
such compensation levels are to be tolerated, hedge fund managers must prove their 
ability to add value. 
 Mallaby himself believes that hedge funds do play a legitimate role in financial 
markets. In fact, he argues that the future of finance and the stability of markets 
would be drastically improved with the continued presence of privately operated 
hedge funds. He points to a variety of differences between hedge funds and other 
entities that serve similar roles in the market, such as investment banks, including the 
following: 1) hedge fund managers have “skin in the game,” as their compensation is 
directly related to fund performance; 2) hedge fund managers do not face the same 
                                                 
 
 
5
 The New York Times reported on December 20, 2006 that Lloyd Blankfein received a $53.4 million bonus, in 
addition to his base salary of $600,000.  
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conflict of interest as investment bank executives6; 3) while investment banks can 
rely on other internal divisions to cover trading losses, hedge funds are measured by 
their investment performance alone and have no internal divisions to hide losses; 4) 
while many Wall Street entities are “too big to fail” without causing serious systemic 
consequences and harm to tax payers, most hedge funds are “small enough to fail” 
without harming the overall economy7; 5) hedge funds have historically been willing 
to direct capital to regions where traditional asset managers have hesitated, often 
aiding economic development in emerging markets.8 
 Among the most important functions that Mallaby discusses, however, is the 
role of hedge funds as liquidity providers. Though they are often looked down upon, 
quantitative and high frequency trading hedge funds are a major contributor to pricing 
efficiency in markets and help to narrow bid-ask spreads. Cao, Liang, Lo, and 
Petrasek (2014) find that, in general, the contribution of hedge funds to price 
efficiency is greater than the contributions of other institutional investors, including 
mutual funds. Pricing efficiency is an important component of market liquidity. Aragon 
and Strahan (2012) study the impact of the 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and 
                                                 
 
 
6
 Trading is only one aspect of an investment bank. They also seek fees for various underwriting and advisory 
services, which have the potential to create conflicts of interest. Mallaby (2010) gives the example of Merrill Lynch 
and subprime collateralized debt obligations leading up to the Crisis. In the company’s quest to create more of 
these structured products, it held a large number of individual mortgage bonds on its balance sheet and 
inadvertently became a major investor in the soon-to-be toxic assets. 
7
 Mallaby (2010) points to the 2006 collapse of the major hedge fund Amaranth Advisers, which had relatively 
minimal economy-wide consequences. 
8
 When emerging markets began opening up in the 1990s, hedge funds were among the first to direct capital to 
these underdeveloped areas. 
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find that the firm’s inability to provide prime brokerage services9 to its hedge fund 
clients had a negative impact on overall market liquidity. In particular, stocks held by 
hedge funds that were using Lehman as a prime broker experienced large declines in 
liquidity compared to otherwise similar stocks that were not held by Lehman-exposed 
funds. 
 Chincarini (2012) presents another historical account of hedge funds. He 
focuses particularly on their relationship to various crises, including the collapse of 
hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 1998, the Quant Crisis of 2007, the 
2008 collapse of Bear Stearns, the 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the 
2010 Flash Crash. He discusses many of the technical aspects of the strategies 
employed by Long Term Capital Management, which are beyond the focus of this 
paper. It is valuable, however, to understand at a fundamental level how hedge funds 
construct their trades.  
As with Mallaby, Chincarini does not believe that hedge funds are necessarily 
harmful to markets. Leverage, for example, a hotly debated aspect of the industry, is 
a tool that allows hedge funds to perform their social function as liquidity and 
efficiency providers. Without leverage, most individual funds simply are not large 
enough to impact prices. Instead, problems arise when “copycats” enter and crowd 
markets after observing the positive performance of hedge funds. If these “copycats” 
subsequently flee the market, they may leave hedge funds, which might otherwise 
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 Hedge funds use prime brokers for a variety of services, including consolidating trade information, providing 
custodial services for securities, providing margin services so they can borrow securities to short, and providing 
short term financing to allow them to increase leverage.  
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have been well-capitalized and able to profit from a particular trade, with illiquid 
positions. Overcrowding in the real estate market leading up to the Crisis eventually 
left countless investors holding worthless assets and ultimately contributed to the 
failure of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, as well as to the necessity of 
government conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.10 
 In addition to more qualitative works, various empirical performance studies 
have been performed on the hedge fund industry using a variety of methods. 
Perhaps the most widely used model in studying returns is to use the Fung and Hsieh 
(2001, 2004) seven-factor model. They choose seven asset-based style factors, 
directly observable in markets, which account for the general risk components of 
hedge fund strategies: a market factor and a size factor for equity markets, a bond 
market and credit spread factor for fixed income markets, and a bond, currency, and 
commodity lookback straddle11 to account for trend-following strategies, which aim to 
buy low and sell high, thus profiting from investor sentiment. Ammann, Huber, and 
Schmid (2011) find that adding a factor to capture emerging markets risk adds value 
to the seven-factor model. 
 Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu (2011) use a model with traditional betas that 
capture equity market risk, bond market risk, and money market risk. They argue that 
                                                 
 
 
10
 The Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) is a government-sponsored private corporation, 
responsible for supporting the secondary market in mortgages. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association 
(“Freddie Mac”) is also a government-sponsored private corporation focused on assisting the mortgage market. 
Both corporations participate in the swap business, in a sense operating as government-sponsored hedge funds.  
11
 A lookback straddle consists of two options: a call option that gives the holder the right to buy an asset at the 
lowest observed price during the life of the call, and a put option that gives the holder the right to sell an asset at 
the highest observed price during the life of the put. This structure essentially allows the option holder to buy low 
and sell high, which is the general goal of trend-following strategies. 
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any returns due to exposure to exotic risks outside of these major asset markets 
should be considered alpha. They also include lagged betas for the three factors to 
account for the fact that many hedge fund holdings are relatively illiquid and difficult 
to constantly mark to market. Using this three-factor model, they perform a return-
based style analysis with the goal of identifying the combination of long positions in 
passive indices that would have most closely replicated the actual performance of a 
fund over a specified time period. Any variability in performance, as measured by the 
R-squareds of their regressions, that is not explained by the model is attributed to 
factors such as the manager’s active security selection or market timing. They find an 
average pre-fee return of 11.42% over the period 1995 – 2009. They deduce that 
3.01% of that average return was alpha. Remarkably, they find positive alphas during 
every year of the last decade, even during the Crisis. They also repeat their analysis 
using the standard Fung and Hsieh model and find statistically significant alphas 
during the same period. 
 More novel methods of empirically measuring historical hedge fund 
performance have also been employed. Cai and Liang (2012) suggest that the seven 
factors used by Fung and Hsieh are imperfect risk factors. They argue that returns 
can be more effectively modeled by applying dynamic linear regression to the factors. 
They find that with certain hedge fund strategies, particularly emerging markets, 
alpha dropped significantly and even became negative during crisis years, namely 
1998 and 2008. On the other hand, they find that some strategies were able to 
maintain a statistically significant positive alpha over time, even during crises. 
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 Dichev and Yu (2011) suggest that standard empirical performance measures, 
which assume that investors buy and hold from inception, do not accurately reflect 
the actual experience of individual hedge fund investors. They propose using dollar-
weighted returns, which reflect the effect of the timing and magnitude of fund flows on 
investor returns. This is significant, they argue, because the majority of hedge fund 
investors do not enter a fund at inception, but rather later in the fund’s life and in 
uneven commitments of capital. They find that, when investors in hedge funds are 
assumed to buy and hold, the average return over 1980 – 2008 is 12.6%.  The dollar-
weighted return for the same period, however, is 6%, which is hardly above the risk-
free rate of return of 5.6% over the same period. While this method may accurately 
reflect the experience of individual investors in hedge funds, we are more interested 
in whether the managers are able to produce excess returns for the fund in general. 
Thus, we feel it is appropriate to use the traditional buy-and-hold measure. 
3 Methodology 
There are specific problems associated with performing empirical analysis on 
hedge funds given the relatively private nature of the industry. Section 3.1 discusses 
the various sources and limitations of hedge fund data. There are a variety of biases 
that arise in hedge fund databases that must be accounted for if empirical work is to 
be meaningful. These biases and their remedies are the subject of section 3.2. 
Finally, in section 3.3 we discuss the main factor model that we will use in our 
empirical analysis. 
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3.1 Sources of Hedge Fund Data 
Although hedge funds are private investment vehicles and typically are not 
subject to the same performance reporting requirements as other investment entities, 
many managers do choose to report performance to a database. Getmansky, Lee, 
and Lo (2015) discuss some of the most widely used databases, which include Lipper 
TASS, Morningstar Hedge / CISDM, Hedge Fund Research, BarclayHedge, 
Albourne, Eurekahedge, eVestment Alliance, HedgeFund.net, HedgeCo.net, Mercer, 
Russell Mellon, U.S. Offshore Funds Directory, and Wilshire Odyssey. These 
databases generally report monthly performance data in addition to information on 
various fund-level attributes. 
 Reporting to a database is in the best interest of some hedge funds, as it 
serves as one of their only forms of advertising. Although some large, well-known, 
and positively performing hedge funds may have no need to solicit new investments 
(and are often closed to new investments anyways), many smaller and mid-sized 
hedge funds do find it necessary. Historical performance that indicates success may 
help managers solicit positive capital inflows. However, the results of a study on 
hedge fund reporting by Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang (2014) seem to imply that it might 
not always be economically viable for hedge funds to report to multiple databases. In 
comparing the population of funds in the CISDM, Eurekahedge, Hedge Fund 
Research, MSCI, and TASS databases, they find that 71% of the total sample of 
funds was covered by only one database. They recommend making use of multiple 
databases in order to capture this lack of symmetry across the various database 
providers. 
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 Unfortunately, access to hedge fund return databases is costly. While it would 
be ideal to use sample return data from across a number of databases so as to 
capture as much of the industry as possible, we are unable to do so in this paper due 
to the cost barrier. In order to measure hedge fund returns we will use the Credit 
Suisse Hedge Fund Indexes, compiled by Credit Suisse Hedge Index LLC.  These 
include a broad index of monthly hedge fund returns across strategies as well as 
indexes of monthly returns on a strategy-by-strategy basis. The Credit Suisse Hedge 
Fund Indexes are asset-weighted indexes based on the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund 
Database. Approximately 9,000 worldwide funds are included in the database and 
the indexes generally represent at least 85% of assets under management in their 
respective strategy universes. Only funds with a minimum of $50 million under 
management, a 12-month reporting track record, and audited financial statements 
are included in the database. The monthly indexes reflect performance net of all fund 
performance fees and expenses.12 Given our limited access to hedge fund return 
data, we must admit and accept the limitations of the empirical capabilities of this 
paper. We do feel, however, that the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indexes are good 
representations of the industry as a whole and will suffice for the purposes of this 
paper. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
12
 More information is available through Credit Suisse Hedge Index LLC. 
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3.2 Biases in Hedge Fund Data 
Due to the private nature of hedge funds and a general lack of performance 
reporting requirements, there are a number of important biases in hedge fund 
databases that, if not addressed, could lead to a significant overstatement of 
performance. Biases in empirical studies of mutual fund performance are discussed 
by Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1992), who find that the natural pruning of a 
database of mutual funds leads to an apparent persistence in performance when risk 
is dispersed among many money managers. This apparent performance persistence 
is the side effect of many of the biases in hedge fund data, which Ackermann, 
McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) explore in depth. We will focus on the two major 
biases that any empirical study of hedge funds must account for in order to provide 
some degree of accuracy. 
 Given that hedge fund performance reporting is optional, a database provider 
can only provide the results that hedge fund managers choose to report. Typically a 
hedge fund will stop reporting data because that fund has failed. It seems reasonable 
to correlate the failure of any particular hedge fund with poor performance. Looking at 
the corollary, it also seems reasonable that a fund with positive performance is much 
less likely to experience failure. Thus, relying on a database that only includes 
actively reporting funds is likely to lead to an overstatement of the actual aggregate 
performance of the hedge fund industry, a phenomenon known as survivorship bias. 
In order to correct for survivorship bias, accurate empirical work should aggregate the 
performance of both dead funds, using a so-called “graveyard” database, and 
actively reporting funds. Using monthly return data from 1995 to 2009 from the Lipper 
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TASS database, Ibbotson, Chen, and Zhu (2011) estimate survivorship bias of 5.21% 
per year. From a different perspective, one might conclude that, because some 
hedge funds choose not to report simply because they do not need additional capital, 
some of the survivorship bias is offset. While this does make logical sense, we have 
not come across empirical evidence in support of such an idea.  
The other concern with hedge fund return data is backfill bias. Since the 
primary motivation for submitting return data to a hedge fund database is to market 
their fund, managers generally elect to begin reporting following a period of 
outperformance (Getmasnky, Lee, Lo 2015). This outperformance might not be 
representative of the fund’s true, long-run performance, however, and so will lead to 
an overstatement of hedge fund returns during the backfilled periods. The above 
researchers attempt to correct for backfill bias by deleting any fund returns for dates 
preceding the fund’s entrance into the database. Fung and Hsieh (2000) also 
propose a method for correcting for backfill bias. By estimating the median incubation 
period, or lag between the inception date and database entrance data of a fund, for 
hedge funds in the TASS database to be 343 days, they argue that dropping the first 
12 reported monthly returns from each fund corrects for backfill bias. Ibbotson, Chen, 
and Zhu (2011) find backfill bias of 3.51% per year using Lipper TASS data from 
1995 to 2009 when also correcting for survivorship bias. 
 Given that we are using pre-constructed indexes of hedge fund returns instead 
of longitudinal data on individual hedge fund returns, we have less control over 
survivorship and backfill bias. The Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indexes do attempt to 
correct for both, however. In order to minimize survivorship bias, funds are not 
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removed from the indexes until they are fully liquidated or fail to meet the financial 
reporting requirements, thus the indexes capture the potential negative performance 
prior to fund failure. Additionally, historic index data is not adjusted as new funds are 
added to the index and liquidated funds are removed, thus the implied poor 
performance of dead hedge funds is accounted for historically in the indexes. The 
indexes attempt to control for backfill bias by only including funds that have a 
minimum reporting track record of 12 months. The Credit Suisse Hedge Fund 
Indexes also filter the potential additional noise created by very small hedge funds by 
only including funds with a minimum of $50 million in assets. This is more restrictive 
than Cai and Liang (2012), who require minimum assets of $10 million. 
3.3 Empirical Model 
While the Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2004) factor model is one of the more widely 
used models in studying hedge fund performance, we would like to use a more 
intuitive model based on Bianchi, Drew, and Stanley (2008). We use eight factors 
that represent strategies that are investable to the “common” investor, including the 
three equity market factors suggested by Fama and French (1992), the momentum 
factor suggested by Carhart (1997)13, a worldwide bond market factor, a core 
commodity market factor, a U.S. Dollar market factor, and a worldwide equity market 
factor (ex U.S.). In order to ensure that the alphas in our regressions are legitimate 
measures of potential excess returns, all factors in the model are measured as 
                                                 
 
 
13
 The Fama-French factors and the Carhart momentum factor were obtained from Wharton Research 
Data Services. The factors are also available through Kenneth R. French’s research website. 
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monthly returns in excess of the risk-free rate, or return on the one-month Treasury 
bill, where applicable. 
We regress monthly returns from the Credit Suisse Hedge fund Indexes using 
the following model: 
(𝑅𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽5(𝐵𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐼𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑇𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽7(𝐷𝑋𝑌𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡)
+ 𝛽8(𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑋𝑈𝑆𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡)
 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝛼𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒 𝐻𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑝 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑀𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑈𝑀𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝐵𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐼𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡14 
𝑇𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑇ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡15 
𝐷𝑋𝑌𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡16 
𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑋𝑈𝑆𝑡 = 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑒𝑥 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡17 
 
In terms of pure equity markets, Eugene Fama (2014) considers the Fama-
French three-factor model to be the most successful asset pricing model in 
empirical tests to date, thus implying the advantage of including additional factors 
beyond the simple Capital Asset Pricing Model. Today, most financial economists 
                                                 
 
 
14
 The Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond index is a global measure of investment grade debt from 24 
local currency markets. As it includes treasury, government-related, corporate, and securitized fixed-
rate bonds from developed and emerging market issuers, we feel that it is a good representation of the 
diverse universe of investable fixed income.  
15
 The Thomson Reuters CoreCommodity CRB index is a representation of a long-only, broadly 
diversified investment in commodities, which we feel most accurately reflects the potential strategy of 
a “common” investor.  
16
 The U.S. Dollar Index benchmarks the U.S. dollar against a basket of major world currencies. 
17
 The MSCI World ex U.S. index captures the performance of large- and mid-cap equities across 22 
of 23 developed market countries, excluding the U.S. The index covers approximately 85% of the free 
float-adjusted market capitalization in each country. 
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would agree that the CAPM’s designation of the market return as the only 
meaningful risk factor is far too restrictive, even for evaluating simple equity 
portfolios. Since hedge fund managers invest in a wide variety of assets beyond 
equities, we must include additional factors in order to ensure that our model is 
broad enough to potentially explain hedge fund returns. The advantage we see to 
the above model is that it represents all the potentially investable assets available to 
the “common” investor. If the model does not explain the variance in monthly 
returns of the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indexes, or if we find statistically significant 
monthly excess returns, we can conclude that the “common” investor might derive 
some benefit from investing in hedge funds. 
We want to compare and contrast the performance of the various hedge fund 
strategies that the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indexes track, which are defined in 
detail in Appendix A.1. In order to do so, we will apply the above model to the broad 
index as well as to the strategy-specific indexes. Additionally, we have a particular 
interest in the performance of the hedge fund industry during the Crisis. We will use 
the model to measure performance over multiple time periods, including before the 
Crisis, during the Crisis, and the recovery from the Crisis. In particular, we are 
interested in whether or not hedge funds were able to deliver excess returns during 
the Crisis and in seeing if there has been any shift in performance characteristics 
following the Crisis. We expect that, given the uncharacteristic severity of the Crisis 
as well as the public backlash toward many financial entities, there may have been 
a fundamental shift in the hedge fund industry. Hedge fund managers today may be 
more risk-averse and may tend to avoid some of the exotic trades that would have 
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allowed them to deliver excess returns in the past, as they suffered consequences 
during the Crisis. 
Bianchi, Drew, and Stanley (2008) find evidence of autocorrelation in the first 
and second moments of their data. In order to control for these effects, they employ 
Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard 
errors. While not widespread, we also find evidence of possible autocorrelation in 
the return data for a few strategies. In addition to the usual OLS standard errors, we 
report the Newey-West standard errors in order to determine the significance of our 
excess returns and factors. We do not find that using the Newey-West standard 
errors has a substantial effect on our results, however. 
4 Results 
Tables 4.1 – 4.2 present summary statistics of the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund 
Indexes and the eight factors included in our model, plus the monthly risk-free rate. 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indexes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Index # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sharpe Ann. Mean
All Funds 253 0.71% 2.03% -7.55% 8.53% 0.25 8.50%
Conv. Arb. 253 0.61% 1.89% -12.59% 5.81% 0.21 7.30%
Ded. Short Bias 253 -0.37% 4.77% -11.28% 22.71% -0.12 -4.43%
Emerg. Markets 253 0.59% 3.80% -23.03% 15.34% 0.10 7.14%
Eq. Mkt. Neut. 253 0.45% 2.81% -40.45% 3.66% 0.09 5.37%
Event Driven 253 0.71% 1.80% -11.77% 4.22% 0.28 8.49%
Fixed In. Arb. 253 0.45% 1.54% -14.04% 4.33% 0.16 5.36%
Global Macro 253 0.92% 2.60% -11.55% 10.60% 0.27 11.04%
L/S Equity 253 0.82% 2.70% -11.43% 13.01% 0.23 9.81%
Mdg. Futures 253 0.48% 3.40% -9.35% 9.95% 0.08 5.82%
Multi-Strat. 253 0.67% 1.38% -7.35% 4.28% 0.34 8.08%
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Eight Factors and Risk-Free Rate. 
 
 
The monthly volatilities of all investable strategies, including hedge funds, 
compared to that of the risk-free rate is evident, thus indicting the relative riskiness 
of most investment strategies. We believe that our monthly deviations are so 
substantial due to the relatively unfriendly time period we are studying, which 
includes a number of crises in the late 1990s, the financial crisis in the early 2000s, 
and the Crisis we are focusing on. Over our sample period of January 1995 – 
January 2016, the annualized mean return of all hedge funds was 8.50% versus 
10.01% for the market, although the sample of hedge funds appears to have 
performed more consistently given the monthly standard deviation of 2.03% versus 
4.48% for the market. Additionally, the Sharpe ratios indicate that the broad index of 
hedge funds and six individual strategy indexes had better risk-adjusted returns 
than any of the investable strategies. 
Tables 4.3 – 4.7 contain the regression results for the Credit Suisse Hedge 
Fund Indexes, using OLS standard errors, for five time periods: the entire sample 
from January 1995 – January 2016, January 1995 – November 2007, December 
2007 – June 2009, December 2007 – December 2012, and July 2009 – January 
Factor # Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sharpe Ann. Mean
Market Return 253 0.83% 4.48% -17.15% 11.35% 0.14 10.01%
High-minus-Low 253 0.18% 3.24% -13.11% 13.91% -0.01 2.15%
Small-minus-Big 253 0.15% 3.47% -16.70% 22.32% -0.02 1.83%
Momentum 253 0.51% 5.26% -34.58% 18.38% 0.06 6.17%
Barclays Agg. Bond 253 0.05% 0.83% -2.55% 2.88% -0.20 0.55%
TR / CC Commodities 253 0.41% 4.96% -19.06% 14.60% 0.04 4.91%
U.S. Dollar Index 253 0.06% 2.34% -5.71% 7.01% -0.06 0.69%
MSCI World ex U.S. 253 0.30% 4.79% -20.87% 12.39% 0.02 3.62%
Risk Free Rate 253 0.21% 0.19% 0.00% 0.56% 0.00 2.49%
  
 
 
26 
2016. Tables 4.8 – 4.12 contain the regression results for the indexes, using 
Newey-West standard errors, for the same time periods. Any terms that are 
statistically significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level are indicated 
with three asterisks (“***”).  
In general the eight factor model that we employ does a good job of 
explaining the variance in monthly hedge fund returns across strategies. While the 
goal of most hedge fund managers is to use differentiating strategies that allow their 
fund to deliver excess returns, these strategies often still depend on many standard 
assets classes, meaning hedge fund performance is subject to standard market 
movements to an extent. On a strategy-by-strategy basis, the statistical significance 
of the eight factors is relatively intuitive and generally in line with what one might 
expect. For example, dedicated short bias funds depend negatively on the market 
given their net short positions, and so the coefficient on the market return factor is 
negative and statistically significant over the sample period; global macro funds look 
to profit from anticipated price movements in equities, foreign exchange, 
commodities, and interest rates, and thus the coefficients on the global aggregate 
credit factor, commodities factor, and U.S. Dollar Index factor are statistically 
significant over the sample period. 
We find that over the sample period, from January 1995 – January 2016, 
hedge funds in general were able to generate excess returns beyond those 
available to the “common” investor through the model’s eight investable factors. On 
a strategy-by-strategy basis, only three strategies (four using Newey-West standard 
errors) did not deliver statistically significant positive excess returns: dedicated short 
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bias, emerging markets, and equity market neutral (and fixed income arbitrage 
using Newey-West standard errors). We find that the broad index delivered a 
monthly excess return of 0.39% (4.67% annualized). The strategy that was able to 
deliver the largest excess return over the sample period was global macro, with a 
monthly excess return of 0.73% (8.72% annualized).  
It seems that the widespread excess returns over the broad sample period, 
however, were driven largely by hedge fund performance prior to the Crisis, from 
January 1995 – November 2007. During this period there were only four strategies 
that did not deliver statistically significant positive excess returns: dedicated short 
bias, emerging markets, fixed income arbitrage, and managed futures. The broad 
index delivered a monthly excess return of 0.49% (5.93% annualized). Global 
macro funds were the highest performing strategy classification, delivering a 
monthly excess return of 0.90% (10.80% annualized). It might also be important to 
note that this pre-Crisis period captures a number of smaller crisis periods that 
impacted the hedge fund industry, including the Asian Currency Crisis, Russian 
Debt Crisis, and the collapse of hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in the 
late 1990s, as well as the early 2000s recession in the United States. While none of 
these crises were of the magnitude of the Crisis, it is still noteworthy that hedge 
funds broadly were able to generate statistically significant positive monthly excess 
returns over the period. 
In general, we find that hedge funds were not immune from the Crisis, as 
neither the broad index of hedge funds nor any individual strategy indexes were 
able to deliver statistically significant positive excess returns over the period 
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December 2007 – June 2009. In fact, we find that all but two strategy classes 
delivered negative, though statistically insignificant, excess returns. The only 
statistically significant result was the -4.29% monthly return of the equity market 
neutral index (although the result is insignificant with Newey-West standard errors). 
Chart 4.1 presents the six-month performance of the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund 
equity market neutral index (See appendix A.2 for six-month performance charts of 
all other strategy indexes). Concurrent with the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the 
strategy collapsed toward the end of 2008. This is no coincidence, as equity market 
neutral funds are typically quantitative in nature and depend on stable historical 
pricing data. When the unprecedented Lehman collapse occurred, the stability of 
such data was severely upset, resulting in astoundingly poor performance for equity 
market neutral funds.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
18
 See Sam Jones’s article in the Financial Times blog FTAlphaville at the following: 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2009/10/08/76666/the-pitfalls-of-being-market-neutral/ 
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Chart 4.1: Equity Market Neutral Index Six-Month Returns, 1995 – 2015. 
 
 The Crisis was unique in that, unlike the early 2000s recession, for example, 
the economy’s recovery was extremely slow and drawn out. Financial market 
participants likely felt the recession’s effects long after it officially ended. In order to 
account for this unique feature of the Crisis, we also apply the model to the time 
period December 2007 – December 2012, incorporating a three year extension past 
the technical end of the Crisis. This is also beneficial statistically, as the longer time 
period provides more individual observations of monthly returns, thus strengthening 
the statistical relevance of our findings. As with the more limited time period, we find 
no evidence that the broad index of hedge funds delivered statistically significant 
positive monthly excess returns. Over this extended period, however, the global 
macro strategy index did provide a statistically significant monthly excess return of 
0.43% (5.11% annualized), continuing its strong performance from earlier periods. 
The results from this extended period bolster our finding that, broadly speaking, 
hedge funds were unable to deliver excess returns during the Crisis. 
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On a positive note for the industry, we find that the broad index of hedge 
funds delivered statistically significant positive monthly excess returns of 0.23% 
(2.74% annualized) during the post-Crisis period of July 2009 – January 2016. 
However, it appears that hedge fund performance characteristics have shifted 
noticeably following the Crisis. The excess returns on the broad index were less 
than half of the excess returns from the pre-Crisis period. Additionally, only three 
individual strategy indexes delivered statistically significant positive excess returns: 
convertible arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage, and multi-strategy. These strategies 
have been quite successful, however, delivering monthly excess returns of 0.55%, 
0.59%, and 0.54% (6.58%, 7.08%, and 6.52% annualized) respectively. 
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Table 4.3: January 1995 – January 2016, Standard OLS Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level) 
   
Table 4.4: January 1995 – November 2007, Standard OLS Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level)
   
January 1995 - January 2016
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. D-W Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies 0.39*** 4.30 0.57 0.56 1.80 0.15*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.34*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.15***
Conv. Arb. 0.42*** 3.90 0.29 0.26 1.29 -0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.17 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.16***
Ded. Short Bias -0.04 -0.25 0.74 0.73 1.77 -0.79*** 0.10 -0.32*** 0.01 0.16 0.04 -0.03 -0.02
Emerg. Markets 0.33 1.81 0.50 0.48 1.56 0.03 -0.07 0.15*** 0.06 0.12 0.09*** 0.37*** 0.51***
Eq. Mkt. Neut. -0.07 -0.39 0.21 0.18 2.15 0.23*** 0.15*** 0.03 -0.01 -0.64*** 0.11*** -0.14 -0.11
Event Driven 0.36*** 4.56 0.58 0.56 1.58 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.03*** -0.11 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.17***
Fixed In. Arb. 0.24*** 2.61 0.26 0.23 1.27 0.02 0.07*** 0.03 -0.01 0.24*** 0.09*** 0.08 0.09***
Global Macro 0.73*** 4.61 0.21 0.18 1.78 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.11*** 0.85*** 0.10*** 0.23*** 0.08
L/S Equity 0.35*** 4.20 0.79 0.78 1.77 0.27*** -0.11*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.14 0.04*** 0.02 0.19***
Managed Futures 0.50*** 2.35 0.17 0.15 1.97 -0.20*** 0.03 -0.02 0.14*** 1.26*** 0.05 0.00 0.21***
Multi-Strat. 0.42*** 5.44 0.32 0.30 1.60 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05*** -0.01 0.11***
January 1995 - November 2007
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. D-W Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies 0.49*** 3.50 0.57 0.54 1.83 0.23*** 0.05 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.46*** 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.11
Conv. Arb. 0.42*** 3.55 0.12 0.07 1.04 0.06 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01
Ded. Short Bias 0.24 0.98 0.76 0.74 1.69 -0.91*** 0.04 -0.29*** -0.02 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.02
Emerg. Markets 0.34 1.10 0.47 0.44 1.55 0.14 0.05 0.20*** 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.48*** 0.54***
Eq. Mkt. Neut. 0.51*** 7.61 0.19 0.14 1.63 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03*** 0.03 0.04
Event Driven 0.50*** 4.47 0.52 0.49 1.56 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.12***
Fixed In. Arb. 0.18 1.78 0.08 0.03 1.36 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02
Global Macro 0.90*** 3.42 0.23 0.19 1.84 0.23*** 0.14 0.08 0.15*** 0.90*** 0.08 0.29*** 0.03
L/S Equity 0.35*** 2.88 0.82 0.81 1.86 0.40*** -0.04 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.21 0.05 -0.01 0.09
Managed Futures 0.39 1.21 0.17 0.12 1.88 -0.18 0.10 0.02 0.10 1.14*** 0.12 -0.04 0.24
Multi-Strat. 0.42*** 4.19 0.13 0.09 1.79 0.05 0.05 0.07*** 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.02
  
 
 
3
2
 
Table 4.5: December 2007 – June 2009, Standard OLS Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level)
   
Table 4.6: December 2007 – December 2012, Standard OLS Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level)
   
December 2007 - June 2009
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. D-W Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies -0.54 -1.78 0.92 0.86 2.01 -0.03 -0.31*** 0.16 -0.06 -0.33 0.17*** 0.13 0.18
Conv. Arb. -0.64 -0.77 0.82 0.68 1.88 0.19 -0.82*** 0.19 -0.18 0.67 0.30*** 0.54 0.12
Ded. Short Bias -1.21 -0.98 0.65 0.38 2.44 -0.53 -0.34 0.26 0.04 -0.19 -0.02 -0.65 -0.08
Emerg. Markets -0.34 -0.57 0.90 0.81 2.65 -0.04 -0.36 0.05 -0.08 0.14 0.18*** 0.11 0.39
Eq. Mkt. Neut. -4.29*** -2.17 0.72 0.50 2.29 0.55 -0.21 1.42 -0.33 -5.01*** 0.41 -0.74 -0.89
Event Driven -0.31 -0.96 0.89 0.79 1.92 -0.02 -0.24*** 0.09 -0.02 -0.38 0.12*** 0.23 0.23
Fixed In. Arb. -0.86 -0.98 0.73 0.51 2.27 0.29 -0.36 0.17 -0.11 0.44 0.31*** 0.39 -0.06
Global Macro -0.24 -0.40 0.71 0.48 2.23 -0.24 -0.25 0.08 -0.08 1.08*** 0.27*** 0.20 0.09
L/S Equity 0.11 0.52 0.97 0.95 2.65 -0.04 -0.33*** -0.01 0.00 -0.22 0.10 0.13 0.39***
Managed Futures 0.07 0.12 0.79 0.63 2.35 -0.82*** 0.22 -0.03 0.02 0.57 0.16*** 0.01 0.36
Multi-Strat. -0.78 -1.75 0.87 0.76 1.62 0.11 -0.52*** 0.16 -0.11*** -0.52 0.16*** 0.16 0.08
December 2007 - December 2012
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. D-W Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies 0.22 1.48 0.76 0.73 1.93 0.02 -0.11 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.10*** 0.19*** 0.23***
Conv. Arb. 0.28 0.99 0.64 0.59 1.48 -0.01 -0.31*** 0.05 -0.09 0.80*** 0.20*** 0.60*** 0.35***
Ded. Short Bias -0.71 -1.97 0.75 0.71 2.15 -0.59*** -0.01 -0.33 0.00 0.80 0.11 -0.05 -0.15
Emerg. Markets 0.17 0.78 0.82 0.80 1.97 -0.05 -0.22*** 0.16 -0.01 0.41 0.12*** 0.15 0.45***
Eq. Mkt. Neut. -0.70 -1.13 0.41 0.32 2.18 0.44 0.28 -0.02 -0.24*** -2.46*** 0.27 -0.34 -0.49
Event Driven 0.29 1.68 0.73 0.69 1.78 0.00 -0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.29 0.04 0.23*** 0.33***
Fixed In. Arb. 0.15 0.60 0.57 0.50 1.50 0.17 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.73*** 0.23*** 0.41*** 0.06
Global Macro 0.43*** 2.10 0.47 0.39 2.13 -0.04 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 1.04*** 0.17*** 0.15 0.07
L/S Equity 0.22 1.67 0.90 0.88 1.85 0.01 -0.19*** 0.11 0.05 -0.18 0.05 0.17*** 0.42***
Managed Futures 0.49 1.21 0.24 0.12 2.31 -0.29 0.15 -0.16 0.15*** 0.77 0.04 -0.15 0.20
Multi-Strat. 0.27 1.60 0.70 0.66 1.42 0.06 -0.21*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 0.11*** 0.27*** 0.21***
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Table 4.7: July 2009 – January 2016, Standard OLS Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level)
   
Table 4.8: January 1995 – January 2016, Newey-West Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level)
   
July 2009 - January 2016
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. D-W Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies 0.23*** 2.48 0.75 0.72 1.96 0.13*** 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.33*** 0.00 0.02 0.14***
Conv. Arb. 0.55*** 4.41 0.57 0.52 1.78 -0.02 0.15*** 0.03 -0.07 0.12 0.11*** 0.04 0.11
Ded. Short Bias -0.31 -1.65 0.90 0.89 2.09 -0.47*** 0.10 -0.63*** 0.12*** 0.02 -0.06 -0.19 -0.31***
Emerg. Markets 0.32 1.89 0.69 0.65 1.84 0.03 -0.05 0.10 -0.04 0.21 0.04 -0.02 0.31***
Eq. Mkt. Neut. 0.14 1.16 0.57 0.52 2.05 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.23 -0.04 -0.30*** 0.05
Event Driven 0.18 1.23 0.69 0.66 1.52 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.00 -0.10 0.01 0.09 0.20***
Fixed In. Arb. 0.59*** 6.65 0.36 0.28 1.57 0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.26*** 0.04 -0.01 0.03
Global Macro 0.22 1.69 0.44 0.37 2.21 0.16*** -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.90*** 0.01 0.07 0.01
L/S Equity 0.16 1.61 0.87 0.86 1.67 0.24*** -0.05 0.09*** 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.21***
Managed Futures -0.32 -0.93 0.41 0.35 2.17 0.31 0.00 -0.20 0.24 2.24*** -0.12 -0.08 0.02
Multi-Strat. 0.54*** 6.33 0.66 0.62 1.86 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.16 0.01 -0.02 0.13***
January 1995 - January 2016
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies 0.39*** 4.24 0.57 0.56 0.15*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.34*** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.15***
Conv. Arb. 0.42*** 3.10 0.29 0.26 -0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.17 0.10*** 0.12 0.16***
Ded. Short Bias -0.04 -0.24 0.74 0.73 -0.79*** 0.10 -0.32*** 0.01 0.16 0.04 -0.03 -0.02
Emerg. Markets 0.33 1.74 0.50 0.48 0.03 -0.07 0.15*** 0.06 0.12 0.09*** 0.37*** 0.51***
Eq. Mkt. Neut. -0.07 -0.21 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.15 0.03 -0.01 -0.64 0.11 -0.14*** -0.11
Event Driven 0.36*** 3.83 0.58 0.56 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.03 -0.11 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.17***
Fixed In. Arb. 0.24 1.88 0.26 0.23 0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.24 0.09*** 0.08 0.09***
Global Macro 0.73*** 4.64 0.21 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.85*** 0.10*** 0.23*** 0.08
L/S Equity 0.35*** 3.93 0.79 0.78 0.27*** -0.11*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.14 0.04*** 0.02 0.19***
Managed Futures 0.50*** 2.40 0.17 0.15 -0.20 0.03 -0.02 0.14*** 1.26*** 0.05 0.00 0.21***
Multi-Strat. 0.42*** 4.40 0.32 0.30 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.11***
  
 
 
3
4
 
Table 4.9: January 1995 – November 2007, Newey-West Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level)
   
Table 4.10: December 2007 – June 2009, Newey-West Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level)
   
January 1995 - November 2007
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies 0.49*** 3.55 0.57 0.54 0.23*** 0.05 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.46*** 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.11
Conv. Arb. 0.42*** 2.74 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01
Ded. Short Bias 0.24 0.92 0.76 0.74 -0.91*** 0.04 -0.29*** -0.02 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.02
Emerg. Markets 0.34 0.97 0.47 0.44 0.14 0.05 0.20*** 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.48*** 0.54***
Eq. Mkt. Neut. 0.51*** 6.62 0.19 0.14 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03*** 0.03 0.04
Event Driven 0.50*** 3.67 0.52 0.49 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.12***
Fixed In. Arb. 0.18 1.51 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04*** 0.04 0.02
Global Macro 0.90*** 3.20 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.14 0.08 0.15*** 0.90*** 0.08 0.29*** 0.03
L/S Equity 0.35*** 2.88 0.82 0.81 0.40*** -0.04 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.21 0.05*** -0.01 0.09***
Managed Futures 0.39 1.12 0.17 0.12 -0.18 0.10 0.02 0.10*** 1.14*** 0.12 -0.04 0.24
Multi-Strat. 0.42*** 4.37 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.07*** 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02
December 2007 - June 2009
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies -0.54 -1.72 0.92 0.86 -0.03 -0.31*** 0.16 -0.06 -0.33 0.17*** 0.13 0.18
Conv. Arb. -0.64 -0.84 0.82 0.68 0.19 -0.82*** 0.19 -0.18 0.67 0.30*** 0.54*** 0.12
Ded. Short Bias -1.21 -1.94 0.65 0.38 -0.53 -0.34 0.26 0.04 -0.19 -0.02 -0.65 -0.08
Emerg. Markets -0.34 -0.62 0.90 0.81 -0.04 -0.36*** 0.05 -0.08 0.14 0.18*** 0.11 0.39***
Eq. Mkt. Neut. -4.29 -1.93 0.72 0.50 0.55 -0.21 1.42 -0.33 -5.01*** 0.41*** -0.74 -0.89
Event Driven -0.31 -0.66 0.89 0.79 -0.02 -0.24*** 0.09 -0.02 -0.38 0.12*** 0.23 0.23
Fixed In. Arb. -0.86 -1.30 0.73 0.51 0.29 -0.36*** 0.17 -0.11 0.44 0.31*** 0.39 -0.06
Global Macro -0.24 -0.70 0.71 0.48 -0.24 -0.25 0.08 -0.08 1.08 0.27*** 0.20 0.09
L/S Equity 0.11 0.58 0.97 0.95 -0.04 -0.33*** -0.01 0.00 -0.22 0.10*** 0.13 0.39***
Managed Futures 0.07 0.23 0.79 0.63 -0.82*** 0.22 -0.03 0.02 0.57 0.16*** 0.01 0.36
Multi-Strat. -0.78 -1.60 0.87 0.76 0.11 -0.52*** 0.16 -0.11 -0.52 0.16*** 0.16 0.08
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Table 4.11: December 2007 – December 2012, Newey-West Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level)
   
Table 4.12: July 2009 – January 2016, Newey-West Errors. (*** = statistically significant at 95% level)
   
December 2007 - December 2012
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies 0.22 1.38 0.76 0.73 0.02 -0.11 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.10*** 0.19*** 0.23***
Conv. Arb. 0.28 0.76 0.64 0.59 -0.01 -0.31 0.05 -0.09 0.80 0.20*** 0.60*** 0.35***
Ded. Short Bias -0.71 -1.97 0.75 0.71 -0.59*** -0.01 -0.33 0.00 0.80 0.11 -0.05 -0.15
Emerg. Markets 0.17 0.70 0.82 0.80 -0.05 -0.22*** 0.16 -0.01 0.41 0.12*** 0.15 0.45***
Eq. Mkt. Neut. -0.70 -1.04 0.41 0.32 0.44 0.28 -0.02 -0.24 -2.46 0.27 -0.34 -0.49
Event Driven 0.29 1.47 0.73 0.69 0.00 -0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.29 0.04 0.23*** 0.33***
Fixed In. Arb. 0.15 0.42 0.57 0.50 0.17 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.73 0.23*** 0.41*** 0.06
Global Macro 0.43*** 2.39 0.47 0.39 -0.04 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 1.04*** 0.17*** 0.15 0.07
L/S Equity 0.22 1.61 0.90 0.88 0.01 -0.19*** 0.11 0.05*** -0.18 0.05 0.17*** 0.42***
Managed Futures 0.49 1.18 0.24 0.12 -0.29 0.15 -0.16 0.15*** 0.77 0.04 -0.15 0.20
Multi-Strat. 0.27 1.22 0.70 0.66 0.06 -0.21*** 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 0.11*** 0.27*** 0.21
July 2009 - January 2016
α α t-stat R-sq. Adj. R-sq. Rm - rf HML SMB MOMENTUM BCABI TRCC DXY MSCIXUS
All Strategies 0.23*** 2.66 0.75 0.72 0.13*** 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.33*** 0.00 0.02 0.14***
Conv. Arb. 0.55*** 3.99 0.57 0.52 -0.02 0.15*** 0.03 -0.07 0.12 0.11*** 0.04 0.11
Ded. Short Bias -0.31 -1.52 0.90 0.89 -0.47*** 0.10 -0.63*** 0.12*** 0.02 -0.06 -0.19*** -0.31***
Emerg. Markets 0.32 1.81 0.69 0.65 0.03 -0.05 0.10 -0.04 0.21 0.04 -0.02 0.31***
Eq. Mkt. Neut. 0.14 1.12 0.57 0.52 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.23 -0.04 -0.30*** 0.05
Event Driven 0.18 1.21 0.69 0.66 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.00 -0.10 0.01 0.09 0.20***
Fixed In. Arb. 0.59*** 6.04 0.36 0.28 0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.26 0.04 -0.01 0.03
Global Macro 0.22 1.75 0.44 0.37 0.16 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.90*** 0.01 0.07 0.01
L/S Equity 0.16 1.61 0.87 0.86 0.24*** -0.05 0.09*** 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.21***
Managed Futures -0.32 -0.96 0.41 0.35 0.31 0.00 -0.20 0.24*** 2.24*** -0.12 -0.08 0.02
Multi-Strat. 0.54*** 5.71 0.66 0.62 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.16 0.01 -0.02 0.13***
x
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5 Conclusion 
After decreasing in size dramatically during the Crisis, the hedge fund 
industry seems to be recovering. Not only are industry assets approaching pre-
Crisis levels, but institutional investment in the industry is giving more financial 
market participants access to hedge fund risks and returns. As a result, up-to-date 
studies of the industry are important in determining what role, if any, hedge funds 
should play in financial markets. In this paper, we study hedge fund return data from 
the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indexes over the period January 1995 – January 
2016. In particular, we use a factor model that represents eight investable strategies 
that the “common” investor might follow in order to determine whether or not hedge 
fund managers were able to deliver excess returns during a number of distinct time 
periods, including before the Crisis, during the Crisis, and after the Crisis. 
We find evidence that hedge fund managers have historically delivered 
statistically significant positive excess returns, particularly prior to the Crisis. From 
January 1995 – November 2007, the broad sample of hedge funds that we studied 
delivered monthly excess returns of 0.49% (5.93% annualized). A number of 
individual strategy indexes also performed well and delivered statistically significant 
positive excess returns. However, it seems that there has been a noticeable shift in 
hedge fund industry performance characteristics. During the period December 2007 
– June 2009, we find that neither the broad index of hedge funds nor any individual 
strategy index delivered statistically significant positive excess returns. We find the 
results to be similar when we extend the Crisis period to include a portion of the 
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drawn out recovery. Here, only one individual strategy index, global macro, 
delivered statistically significant positive monthly excess returns. During the post-
Crisis period, from July 2009 – January 2016, hedge fund managers do not seem to 
have been as successful as they were previously. While we find that the broad 
index did deliver statistically significant positive monthly excess returns of 0.23% 
(2.74% annualized), this is substantially less than the pre-Crisis period. Additionally, 
only three strategy styles seem to have contributed to these excess returns. 
The apparent shift in the performance characteristics of the hedge fund 
industry may be suggestive of a shift in the risk appetites of hedge fund managers. 
The Crisis may have served as a wake-up call to the dangers of excessive risk-
taking behaviors that may have contributed to the positive excess returns that 
hedge funds delivered prior to the Crisis. The public criticism that has been aimed 
toward most of the financial industry, including hedge funds, following the Crisis 
might also have contributed to such a shift in managers’ risk appetites. Additionally, 
the growing size of the hedge fund industry is symptomatic of another likely reason 
that its performance characteristics have shifted. There are simply a huge number 
of hedge funds today and managers can only differentiate their strategies to such a 
degree. Many of the “secrets” that allowed successful fund managers to deliver 
impressive returns in the 1990s and early 2000s seem to be out. The hedge fund 
industry may be the next example of a classic problem with perfectly competitive 
markets: once information about a profitable strategy becomes common knowledge, 
competitors enter the market and profits vanish. 
  
 
 
38 
It is not necessarily a bad thing if hedge fund managers are becoming more 
risk averse, particularly as more financial market participants gain exposure to 
hedge fund risks and returns. The pension funds and institutional investors that are 
slowly becoming the hedge fund industry’s largest customers often manage money 
on behalf of “common” people. Logically, “common” people likely have much lower 
risk tolerances than the wealthy individuals who were the main hedge fund 
constituents in the past. In order to continue attracting capital from investors, then, 
hedge fund managers must understand that positive fund returns cannot simply be 
the product of increased risk that people are not willing to bear. 
It is important to note that, while hedge funds do serve a legitimate role in 
financial markets and we find that they have been able to deliver positive excess 
returns historically, they are certainly not immune from financial crises. Even though 
managers might strive to deliver absolute returns regardless of prevailing market or 
economic conditions, it is nearly impossible to avoid getting caught up in a systemic 
event of the magnitude of the Crisis. In general, our results do not indicate that 
hedge fund managers are able to deliver positive excess returns during such a time. 
While hedge funds can certainly play a role in a well-diversified investing strategy 
and do contribute to financial markets in a variety of ways, there should be no 
expectation that the broad industry or any individual strategy will consistently deliver 
excess returns, particularly during crisis periods. 
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A Appendix 
A.1 Credit Suisse Hedge Index LLC Strategy Classifications 
Credit Suisse Hedge Index LLC breaks the hedge fund universe into ten 
primary categories. Table A.1 contains the descriptions, taken directly from Credit 
Suisse Hedge Index LLC, of the individual strategies. 
Table A.1: Credit Suisse Hedge Index LLC Strategy Classifications. 
 
Convertible arbitrage funds typically aim to profit
from the purchase of convertible securities and the
subsequent shorting of the corresponding stock
when there is a pricing error made in the
conversion factor of the security. Managers of
convertible arbitrage funds typically build long
positions of convertible and other equity hybrid
securities and then hedge the equity component of
the long securities positions by shorting the
underlying stock or options. The number of shares
sold short usually reflects a delta neutral or market
neutral ratio. As a result, under normal market
conditions, the arbitrageur generally expects the
combined position to be insensitive to fluctuations
in the price of the underlying stock.
Dedicated short bias funds typically take more
short positions than long positions and earn returns
by maintaining net short exposure in long and short
equities. Detailed individual company research
typically forms the core alpha generation driver of
dedicated short bias managers, and a focus on
companies with weak cash flow generation is
common. To affect the short sale, the manager
typically borrows the stock from a counterparty and
sells it in the market. Short positions are sometimes
implemented by selling forward. Risk management
often consists of offsetting long positions and stop-
loss strategies.
Emerging markets funds typically invest in
currencies, debt instruments, equities and other
instruments of countries with “emerging” or
developing markets (typically measured by GDP
per capita). Such countries are considered to be in
a transitional phase between developing and
developed status. Examples of emerging markets
include China, India, Latin America, much of
Southeast Asia, parts of Eastern Europe, and parts
of Africa. The index has a number of subsectors,
including arbitrage, credit and event driven, fixed
income bias, and equity bias.
Equity market neutral funds typically take both
long and short positions in stocks while seeking to
reduce exposure to the systemic risk of the market
(i.e., a beta of zero is desired). Equity market
neutral funds typically seek to exploit investment
opportunities unique to a specific group of stocks,
while maintaining a neutral exposure to broad
groups of stocks defined for example by sector,
industry, market capitalization, country, or region.
The index has a number of subsectors including
statistical arbitrage, quantitative long/short,
fundamental long/short and index arbitrage.
Managers often apply leverage to enhance returns.
Event driven funds typically invest in various asset
classes and seek to profit from potential mispricing
of securities related to a specific corporate or
market event. Such events can include: mergers,
bankruptcies, financial or operational stress,
restructurings, asset sales, recapitalizations, spin-
offs, litigation, regulatory and legislative changes as
well as other types of corporate events. Event
driven funds can invest in equities, fixed income
instruments (investment grade, high yield, bank
debt, convertible debt and distressed), options and
various other derivatives. Many event driven fund
managers use a combination of strategies and
adjust exposures based on the opportunity sets in
each subsector.
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Fixed income arbitrage funds typically attempt to
generate profits by exploiting inefficiencies and
price anomalies between related fixed income
securities. Funds often seek to limit volatility by
hedging out exposure to the market and interest
rate risk. Strategies may include leveraging long
and short positions in similar fixed income
securities that are related either mathematically or
economically. The sector includes credit yield curve
relative value trading involving interest rate swaps,
government securities and futures; volatility trading
involving options; and mortgage-backed securities
arbitrage (the mortgage-backed market is primarily
U.S.-based and over-the-counter).
Global macro funds typically focus on identifying
extreme price valuations and leverage is often
applied on the anticipated price movements in
equity, currency, interest rate and commodity
markets. Managers typically employ a top-down
global approach to concentrate on forecasting how
political trends and global macroeconomic events
affect the valuation of financial instruments. Profits
can be made by correctly anticipating price
movements in global markets and having the
flexibility to use a broad investment mandate, with
the ability to hold positions in practically any market
with any instrument. These approaches may be
systematic trend following models, or discretionary.
Long/short equity hedge funds typically invest in
both long and short sides of equity markets,
generally focusing on diversifying or hedging across
particular sectors, regions or market capitalizations.
Managers typically have the flexibility to shift from
value to growth; small to medium to large
capitalization stocks; and net long to net short.
Managers can also trade equity futures and options
as well as equity related securities and debt or build
portfolios that are more concentrated than
traditional long-only equity funds.
Managed futures funds (often referred to as CTAs
or Commodity Trading Advisors) typically focus on
investing in listed bond, equity, commodity futures
and currency markets, globally. Managers tend to
employ systematic trading programs that largely
rely upon historical price data and market trends. A
significant amount of leverage may be employed
since the strategy involves the use of futures
contracts. CTAs tend not to have a particular bias
towards being net long or net short any particular
market.
Multi-strategy funds typically are characterized by
their ability to allocate capital based on perceived
opportunities among several hedge fund strategies.
Through the diversification of capital, managers
seek to deliver consistently positive returns
regardless of the directional movement in equity,
interest rate or currency markets. The added
diversification benefits may reduce the risk profile
and help to smooth returns, reduce volatility and
decrease asset-class and single-strategy risks.
Strategies adopted in a multi-strategy fund may
include, but are not limited to, convertible bond
arbitrage, equity long/short, statistical arbitrage and
merger arbitrage.
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A.2 Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index Six-Month Returns 
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